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I. The Business of Terrorism
In today's world, it often feels like terrorism is everywhere. But has
international terrorism become so pervasive that it has touched one of the
most secure and sophisticated institutions in the Western world? Has
funding international terrorism become a business opportunity for our
banks? In a recent federal court decision, Owens v. BNP Paribas (hereinafter
Owens II),' the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed a lawsuit filed against an international bank by the victims and
families affected by the 1998 American embassy bombings. The dismissed
complaint alleged that the bank was civilly liable for the victims' injuries
under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA).2 In dismissing this claim, the court
addressed the ill-defined proximate causation requirement necessary to
trigger liability under the ATA, as well as the concept of secondary liability
under the ATA.3 But, the court's analysis of this claim is flawed due to its
minimized consideration of the innate foundation tort law provides for the
ATA.
In 1998, Osama bin Laden's international terrorist organization, al Qaeda,
bombed the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing over
two hundred people and injuring thousands more.4 Despite the occurrence
of the attacks in 1998, the legally pertinent time period for the provision of
liability began in the early 1990s, when the Sudanese government invited bin
Laden and al Qaeda to relocate to Sudan, giving rise to a symbiotic
relationship between the nation and the terror organization.5 Sudan
provided a safe haven for al Qaeda members to live, train, and own
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1. Owens v. BNP Paribas S.A., 235 F. Supp. 3d 85, 100 (D.D.C. 2017) [hereinafter Owens II].
2. Amended Complaint l,/ [Owens II] (No. 15-1945).
3. Id. at 90.
4. Id. at 86-87.
5. Id. at 88.
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businesses free from probing Western intelligence agencies.6 In exchange,
the terrorists generated funds for the nation's economy, as well as
manufactured and provided weapons to the Sudanese government.7 As a
result of this relationship, the United States declared Sudan to be a state-
sponsor of terrorism in 1993, a status it maintains today.8 The United States
went on to impose a variety of sanctions on the Sudanese government,
including a ban on defense exports and sales, eventually leading to a
complete trade embargo in 1997.9 The embargo banned the exportation of
any financial services to Sudan, including the processing of financial
transactions for the Sudanese government, without a license from the U.S.
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).o
Additionally, sanctions were imposed on the National Bank of Sudan and all
major Sudanese commercial banks."
The role of BNP Paribas and its potential connection to the 1998 terrorist
attacks was not pursued by the victims and families affected until after BNP
Paribas made certain statements during a separate legal action in 2014
regarding its violations of the financial sanctions placed on Sudan.12
Relying on those statements, the plaintiffs brought suit against the
multinational financial services company BNP Paribas, S.A., and a number
of its affiliates (collectively, BNPP).13 In July of 2014, BNPP pled guilty to
conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, as
well as the Trading with the Enemy Act.14 BNPP also admitted to violating
United States sanctions imposed on Sudan, Iran, and Cuba, conspiring with
other banks to circumvent such sanctions, and knowingly, intentionally, and
willfully moving more than 8.8 billion dollars through the American
financial system on behalf of sanctioned entities between the years 2002 and
2007.15 Specifically regarding Sudan, the bank admitted during the 2014
litigation that it "willfully and knowingly structured, conducted, and
concealed U.S. dollar transactions using the U.S. financial system on behalf
of banks and other entities located in or controlled by Sudan."16 Strikingly,
BNPP admitted that its employees recognized the central role BNPP played
in providing sanctioned entities access to the U.S. financial system, thereby
indirectly supporting terrorism and human rights abuses.17
6. Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 174 F. Supp. 3d 242, 280 (D.D.C. 2016), affd, 864 F.3d 751
(D.C. Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Owens I].
7. See id.
8. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 87.
9. Id. at 88.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, T 73-74.
13. Id. T 30.
14. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 87.
15. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, T 73; Notice of Defs.' Motion to Dismiss at 4, [Owens
II] (No. 15-1945).
16. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, T 77.
17. Id. T 78.
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The subject of the 2014 litigation focused on the actions of BNPP from
2002 to 2007.18 BNPP admitted that its illegal activities began in 1997-
shortly after the imposition of U.S. sanctions against Sudan-when BNPP's
Geneva branch (BNP Paribas Suisse) agreed to become the only bank in
Europe to work with Sudanese government banks, despite such activity
being specifically prohibited by the United States.19 As a result of this
activity, nearly all of the major Sudanese banks held U.S. dollar-
denominated accounts through their relationship with BNPP.20 Further,
BNPP admitted to using satellite banks in Africa, Europe, and the Middle
East for the purpose of circumventing U.S. sanctions and that some of these
satellite banks had "no other business purpose than to clear payments for
Sudanese clients."21
The plaintiffs have already succeeded in their civil suit against the
Republic of Sudan for providing material support to the al Qaeda terrorists
who carried out the 1998 embassy attacks in the case of Owens v. Republic of
Sudan ("Owens I").22 Upon learning of the bank's admittances in the course
of the 2014 sanctions litigation, the same plaintiffs filed the case of Owens II
to seek civil damages from BNPP under the ATA for the bank's involvement
with Sudan in relation to the 1998 terrorist attacks.23
II. The Bad Guy Got Away: Owens II
A. CRITICAL ISSUES
In Owens II, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding
that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.24
BNPP provided three different arguments for the court to consider when
dismissing the claim: (1) that the plaintiffs' arguments were premised on
theories of secondary civil liability, which does not exist in the ATA; (2) that
the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead a causal connection between the
bank's actions and the plaintiffs injuries; and (3) that the plaintiffs claims
are time barred.25 Only addressing the first two arguments, the court
dismissed the plaintiffs' secondary liability claims, holding that the ATA does
not provide liability for aiding and abetting primary violators.26 Thus, the
plaintiffs could only be successful in a primary liability claim, for which the
court held the pleadings did not establish the required element of proximate
causation.27
18. Notice of Defs.' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 15, at 5.
19. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, T 82.
20. Id.
21. Id. T 88.
22. Owens 1, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 280.
23. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, T 130.
24. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 100.
25. Id. at 90. See Mot. to Dismiss at 9.
26. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 95.
27. Id. at 100.
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B. COURT'S INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE ATA
1. Statutory Interpretation of the ATA
Before addressing either of the defendant's arguments for dismissal, the
court began by discussing its interpretation of the relevant provisions of the
ATA.28 The plaintiffs asserted their private right of action under Section
2333(a) of the ATA. The provision reads in full:
(a) Action and jurisdiction. Any national of the United States injured in
his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of
international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue
therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall
recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit,
including attorney's fees.29
The court interpreted the statute so as to require three elements: "(1)
injury to a U.S. national; (2) [involving] an act of international terrorism;
and (3) causation."30 Notably, the court provided no requirement related to
a purported defendant's state of mind.
Federal courts that have addressed cases of civil liability under the ATA
have held that Section 2333 creates a private federal cause of action for
individuals injured by acts of international terrorism and that "common law
tort principles provide[][] clear and well-settled rules" for claims arising
from violations of the statute.3' Thus, because a Section 2333 claim can
provide for treble damages, which are typically only prescribed to
intentional tort claims, the intent requirement for Section 2333 requires
some kind of deliberate misconduct by the defendant, i.e., something more
than mere negligence.32
The court went on to state that an act of deliberate misconduct under
Section 2333 must relate to an act of international terrorism. In the case at
bar, the plaintiffs claimed that this requirement was satisfied by BNPP's
provision of "material support" to terrorist organizations, which is classified
as an act of international terrorism by Section 2339 of the ATA.33
The court held that the scienter requirement of Section 2333 and the
scienter requirement for the requisite act of international terrorism both
28. Id. at 90.
29. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(a) (West).
30. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 90. The court determined that causation requirement of
Section 2333(a) is proximate causation, not cause in fact.
31. 195 A.L.R. Fed. 217 (originally published in 2004). See Ungar v. Palestine Liberation
Org., 402 F.3d 274, 280 (1st Cir. 2005); Gilmore v. The Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Auth.,
422 F. Supp. 2d 96, 99 (D.D.C. 2006).
32. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 90 (citing to Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development ("Boim II"), 549 F.3d 685, 692-93 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F.Supp.2d 474, 503 (E.D.N.Y. 2012);
Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F.Supp.2d 1, 42 (D.D.C. 2010); Goldberg v. UBS AG,
660 F.Supp.2d 410, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)).
33. Section 2339 criminalizes the following as actions of international terrorism:
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must be met in order to succeed on a primary liability claim under Section
2333.34 So in the case of Owens II, the plaintiffs had to show that (1) the
bank had at least a reckless disregard for the nature of their actions under
Section 2333, and that (2) the bank intentionally or knowingly provided
material support to a terrorist organization in order to establish an "act of
international terrorism" under Section 2339 to succeed on their primary
liability claim under Section 2333.35
2. Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the ATA
After explaining its interpretation of the statutory requirements of the
plaintiffs' claim, the court discussed whether the ATA provides liability for
aiding and abetting. The court noted that Section 2339 already provides a
form of secondary liability for "impos[ing] liability for attempt and
conspiracy."36 The court held, however, that the plaintiffs failed to
sufficiently plead the scienter requirement of Section 2339, thereby
eliminating the plaintiffs' primary liability claim under Section 2333 and any
secondary liability claim under Section 2339.37 Thus, the plaintiffs could
have prevailed only if the ATA provided for secondary liability for aiding and
abetting under Section 2333.38
While courts initially held that the ATA provided such liability under this
section,39 recent courts have held that there is no aiding and abetting liability
under the ATA.40 The court discussed recent Second and Seventh Circuit
decisions, which held the ATA cannot impose civil liability for aiding and
(A) Providing material support to terrorists, knowing or intending that the
provided support will be used to carry out an act of violence against a U.S. national
or general public,
(B) Knowingly providing, attempting, conspiring to provide material resources to a
foreign terrorist organization, and
(C) Willingly providing or collecting funds, knowing or intending that the funds
will-directly or indirectly be used to carry out an act of terrorism.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2339(A-C); Owens H1, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 91.
34. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 90-91.
35. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 91. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16-
17 (2010) (discussing the state-of-mind requirement, the Court clarified that "Congress plainly
spoke to the necessary mental state for a violation of § 2339B, and it chose knowledge about the
organization's connection to terrorism, not specific intent to further the organization's terrorist
activities.").
36. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 95.
37. Id. at 99.
38. Id. at 91.
39. See, e.g., Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. ("Boim I"), 291 F.3d 1000, 1019-21 (7th Cir.
2002), overruled sub nom. by Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. ("Boim III"), 549 F.3d
685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc); In re Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S'holder
Deriv. Litig., 690 F.Supp.2d 1296, 1309-10 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
40. See Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 91. See also, e.g., Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82,
97-98 (2nd Cir. 2013) (concluding that the ATA does not incorporate civil liability for aiding
and abetting); Boim III, 549 F.3d at 689 (overruling Boim I holding that permitted civil aiding
and abetting liability under the ATA); In re Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute &
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abetting because the statute itself does not provide for it.4' Both courts
relied heavily on the Supreme Court case, Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., which precluded liability for aiders and
abettors under the federal securities laws.42 In fact, Central Bank popularized
the presumption that a federal civil liability statute that is silent on aiding
and abetting liability intends not to provide aiding and abetting liability.43
In adopting this presumption, the Owens II court rejected the plaintiffs'
contention that Congress intended to create a broad scope of liability "at any
point along the causal chain of terrorism," by noting that policy cannot
govern interpretation.44 Additionally, the court held that the ATA in fact
explicitly includes forms of secondary liability in its criminal provisions, and
therefore, the absence of provisions for secondary liability in the civil
liability provisions was, thus, a conscious act on the part of Congress.45
3. Causation Under the ATA
The court then goes on to address the parties' dispute regarding the
causation requirement of Section 2333(a).46 Again, this provision of the ATA
states that a U.S. national may sue for damages if their person or property is
"injured 'by reason of an act of international terrorism."47 Both the
plaintiffs and the defendant agreed that this "by reason of' language means
that proximate cause is necessary, but the parties disagreed as to what the
proximate cause requirements are.48 The defendant contended that
proximate cause requires a more direct causal connection between a
defendant's actions and the injury, while the plaintiffs asserted a looser
standard that the injury need only be a "reasonably foreseeable result of
defendants' conduct."49
After evaluating both proposed standards, the court noted that the
plaintiffs' standard was actually applied in an analogous suit: Rothstein v. UBS
AG.s0 In Rothstein, victims of various terrorist attacks in Israel between 1997
and 2006 alleged that the defendant bank was civilly liable for their injuries
under the ATA because the bank was providing funds to Iran, another state
S'holder Deriv. Litig., Nos. 08-01916-MD, 08-020641-Civ KAM, 2015 WL 71562 (S.D. Fla.
Jan. 6, 2015) (reversing earlier decision permitting secondary liability after Rothstein).
41. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 92.
42. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 93; Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). See Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 97 (citing Central Bank);
Boim III, 549 F.3d at 689 (same).
43. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191; accord Boim III, 549 F.3d at 689.
44. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 93.
45. Id. at 95.
46. Id.
47. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(a).
48. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 95.
49. Mot. to Dismiss at 11-12; Pl.'s Response to Motion to Dismiss at 8-9, [Owens II] (No.
15-1945).
50. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 87, 97.
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sponsor of terrorism.,' The plaintiffs claimed that either the terrorist
organization knowns as Hezbollah or the terrorist organization known as
Hamas was responsible for the series of bombings that injured or killed the
plaintiffs, and that Iran was providing material support to both of these
organizations during the time of the attacks.52 Even with the plaintiffs'
weaker formulation of causation-that he injury only be foreseeable-the
Rothstein court still found that "[w]ithout a more concrete connection" to
prove that Iran did or was likely to have funneled money processed by the
defendant bank directly to the terrorists who harmed the plaintiffs, that
liability for the defendants was precluded.53 Thus, the Rothstein court held
that plaintiffs' injuries were not a "natural" consequence of the bank's
conduct with Iran.54 The Owens II court adopted the Rothstein court's
approach and subsequently applied proximate cause as it is "typically
defined" by requiring that the plaintiffs show that their injuries were "the
natural and probable consequence of the [defendant's acts] and ought to
have been foreseen in light of the circumstances."5"
In attempting to prove such causation, the plaintiffs pled the following
facts for the relevant 1997-1998 time frame: (1) BNPP became the exclusive
European bank providing financial services to Sudanese banks; (2) BNPP
created regional satellite banks to further this assistance to Sudan; and (3)
BNPP used these satellite banks to get around the United States' sanctions
on Sudan.56 The court reasoned that the proposed facts, even if taken as
true, could only establish that BNPP had a connection to Sudan prior to
1998, but that the plaintiffs provided no facts to show that the funds
processed by BNPP were being explicitly used by Sudan to support al
Qaeda.57 In fact, the court reasoned that the Sudanese government had a
variety of non-terrorism related responsibilities to which it could have
applied the BNPP funds58 The court reasoned:
[T]he fact that money was transferred to or for a state-sponsor of
terrorism makes it more likely that the money was used for terrorism
than if the transfers had been to a state that was not a sponsor of
terrorism . . . It is not sufficient to merely allege that it was
"foreseeable" that if defendants processed transactions for Sudan, Sudan
might give some of that money to al Qaeda.59
51. Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 91.
52. Id. at 87.
53. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 97 (discussing Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 91).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 97 (quoting Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 105
(D.D.C. 2003)).
56. Amended Complain, at ¶¶ 82-83, 90-91.
57. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 98-99.
58. Id. at 98.
59. Id. (emphasis theirs).
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The plaintiffs also argued that money is fungible, and thus, any money
that BNPP supplied to Sudan should be treated as if it was funneled to al
Qaeda, even if the actual BNPP funds were being used for non-terrorist
activities. But the court rejected this argument, noting that if all financial
transactions with a state-sponsor of terrorism were fungible, OFAC would
not distribute licenses to permit certain financial transactions with Sudan.60
Additionally, the court held that to adopt the plaintiffs' argument of
fungibility "would mean that any provider of U.S. currency to a state
sponsor of terrorism would be strictly liable for injuries subsequently caused
by a terrorist organization associated with that state," and that such strict
liability could not feasibly exist.61 Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to allege
that the bank's actions with Sudan were the proximate cause of their injuries
sustained in the bombings.62
III. Making Them Pay: Proper Application of Tort Law
Principles
With Owens II now on appeal, it is possible that the D.C. Circuit could
reverse or remand the district court's decision. This is due to the court's
misapplication-or lack of application-of tort law principles to the ATA.
The court inconsistently applied tort concepts to interpret the ATA's silence
regarding aiding and abetting liability, incorrectly assumed that strict
liability could not be applied to BNPP, and mischaracterized the danger of
BNPP's activities. Each of these mistakes will be addressed in turn.
First, the court dealt with statutory silence within the ATA in inconsistent
ways. Regarding the lack of an intent requirement in Section 2333, the
court accepted case law that applied the spirit of tort law to the ATA.63 The
court supplemented the statute's silence regarding intent with related tort
law, deducing that the treble damages provided for in the statute must
equate it with torts that require recklessness.64 Therefore, despite the
silence of Section 2333 regarding intent, the court held that traditional tort
law imputed the requirement of reckless intent to the statute.65 But, when
discussing how the same statute is silent regarding aiding and abetting
liability, the court did not apply the same reasoning.66 Generally, tort law
imparts liability for aiding and abetting.67 As a result, applying the spirit of
60. Id. at 100 ("[T]he 'money is fungible' argument urged by plaintiffs does not appropriately
extend to this context."). See Holder, 561 U.S. at 31.
61. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 100.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 90.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 92.
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 15 (Am. LAW INST. 2000);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Leahey Const.
Co., 219 F.3d 519, 532 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[We conclude that the Supreme Court of Ohio would
recognize aiding and abetting liability. . . "); Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Giacomi, 659 A.2d 1166,
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tort law-as the court did in its scienter discussion-should have resulted in
the provision of aiding and abetting liability being imputed to Section
2333.68 Rather, the court deferred to federal securities case law in declining
to impose aiding and abetting liability.69 As a result, the court's reasoning in
Owens II is flawed, and should be overturned at the appellate level to allow
aiding and abetting liability claims to arise under Section 2333 of the ATA.
The court also applied flawed reasoning when discussing how the tort
concept of aiding and abetting cannot be applied because another tenant of
tort law-strict liability-cannot be applied to the ATA.70 The court
pointed out that there is no mention of strict liability in the ATA and that no
one appears to have suggested that strict liability applies.' Further, the
court notes how strict liability cannot be applied to all activities with state
sponsors of terrorism, lest the court contradicts Congress.72 Because
Congress allows some activity to occur with state sponsors of terrorism if the
entity has the appropriate permission from OFAC, the court reasoned that
construing strict liability for BNPP's activities would make the actions
explicitly permitted by Congress illegal23 Thus, because the tort concept of
strict liability is inviable in the context of the ATA, the court reasoned, other
tort concepts such as aiding and abetting should also be precluded from
application under the ATA.74 But the court's premise is flawed.
Strict liability provides that "one who carries on an abnormally dangerous
activity is subject liability for harm,"75 regardless of if the actor had any
intent to inflict the harm.76 An "abnormally dangerous activity" is
determined by considering a number of factors.77 Notable amongst these
factors are:
[The] inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
. . . [the] extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
. . . [the]inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried
1178 (1995) ("Additionally, to the extent that § 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides for aider and abettor liability, an aggrieved party may have a tort cause of action.");
Saunders v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 832, 846 (1994) ("Liability may also be imposed
on one who aids and abets the commission of an intentional tort .
68. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 95.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 94.
71. Id. (citing Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)).
72. Id. (citing Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)).
73. Id. at 100.
74. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 100 (quoting Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 96 (2d Cir.
2013)).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 519 (1977).
76. See id. at comment (e) ("The liability stated in this Section is not based upon any intent of
the defendant o do harm . . . The liability arises out of the abnormal danger of the activity
itself, and the risk that it creates, of harm to those in the vicinity.").
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 520 (1977).
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on; and . . . [the]extent to which its value to the community is
outweighed by its dangerous attributes.78
It seems very feasible that the spirit of strict liability is alive and well in the
ATA. In the case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court
of the United States discussed how Congress, in constructing Section 2339
crimes, held that "terrorist organizations are so tainted by their criminal
conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that
conduct."79 Therefore, the Owens II court recognized that even if you
provide money to a terrorist organization only to be used for peaceful
activities, you are still furthering the violent activities of that organization
and are liable under the ATA.o Juxtaposing this conclusion against the tort
foundation of the ATA, it appears that any donation to a terrorist
organization, regardless of intent, should be sufficient to engender liabilitys1
Therefore, providing funds to a terrorist organization is akin to an
"abnormally dangerous activity" because all funds for a terrorist organization
are fungible.
Of course, the facts do not show that BNPP gave any funds directly to al
Qaeda, only that BNPP supplied funds to Sudan.82 So, the court held that to
treat BNPP's funding to Sudan the same as if the bank had given directly to
a terrorist organization "would mean that any provider of U.S. currency to a
state sponsor of terrorism would be strictly liable for injuries subsequently
caused by a terrorist organization associated with that state."83 But, this
mischaracterized what BNPP's activities actually were. The funds at issue in
this case were not simply funds provided to a state sponsor of terrorism; the
funds were provided to a state sponsor of terrorism in knowing violation of
sanctions placed on that state sponsor to deter continued terrorist support.84
Therefore, holding such activity as abnormally dangerous would not
contradict Congress's intention to permit certain financial activities under
OFAC. Further, holding such activity as abnormally dangerous would not
mean that any provider of U.S. currency to a state sponsor of terrorism
would be strictly liable; only that illegal or non-permitted providers of U.S.
currency to a state sponsor of terrorism would be strictly liable.
It is this combination of both characteristics of BNPP's funds-that they
were not only provided to a state sponsor of terrorism, but that they were
also provided illegally by intentionally violating sanctions on that state
sponsor-that should be evaluated as an "abnormally dangerous activity" for
strict liability. And, again, looking back at some of the factors to classify
"abnormally dangerous activities," BNPP's activities seem to fit the bill for
78. Id. at §§ (c-f).
79. Holder, 561 U.S. at 29 (internal citations omitted).
80. Owens 11, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 100.
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 519 (comment e).
82. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 98.
83. Id. at 100 (citing Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 515-16) (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 88.
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strict liability. For example, one of the factors is whether the risk of injury
from the activity can be eliminated by reasonable care.85 Indeed, this very
purpose is served by applying for a license through OFAC, which certainly
would not permit funding that has a risk of being channeled to terrorist
organizations.86 Another factor is the "inappropriateness of the activity to
the place where it is carried on," and here, BNPP's actions were clearly
inappropriate as they were illegally providing U.S. dollar funding to a nation
subjected to a complete trade embargo.87 Another factor is the "extent to
which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes."88 Certainly the dangers of funding a state sponsor of terrorism
would be high, but the court does not mention any value given to the
community of Sudan, or any other community for that matter, that was
supplied by BNPP's activities.89 Even from this cursory glance, it is clear
that there is some merit to the application of strict liability to BNPP's
activities that the court should not have so quickly dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
In the days after al Qaeda's attacks on September 11, 2001, President
Bush issued an executive order prohibiting any American transactions with
entities linked to terrorism.90 In his remarks on the order, the President
stated, "We will starve the terrorists of funding, turn them against each
other, root them out of their safe hiding places and bring them to justice."91
Although these remarks were issued three years after the terrorist attacks in
question, they could not be more relevant to the circumstances in Owens II.
Sudan was sheltering al Qaeda soldiers not only from bodily harm, but also
from justice, as the terrorists continued to plot and kill from their Sudanese
home.92 BNPP knowingly funded the Sudanese with American dollars, and
in doing so, intentionally violated the sanctions put in place to protect
Americans.93 Yet, the court unduly narrowed the paths of justice available to
the victims of the 1998 attacks by inconsistently applying the ATA's
foundation of tort law. Additionally, in order to deprive the terrorists of
funding, strict liability should be considered for banks that intentionally
circumvent sanctions to fund state sponsors of terrorism. While the D.C.
Circuit may still affirm this decision, the interests of justice warrant at least a
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 520(c).
86. See Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 88.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 520(e).
88. Id. at § 520(f).
89. Owens II, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 100.
90. Bush: 'We Will Starve the Terrorists', CNN.com (Sept. 24, 2001 10:19AM), http://
edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/24/ret.bush.transcript/index.html.
9 1. Id.
92. See Owens 1, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 280.
93. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, T 77.
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more in-depth examination of whether the illegal provision of American
money, which may have been used to murder Americans, is an abnormally
dangerous activity.
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